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Abstract 
Article 49 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union contains the principle of freedom of 
establishment. Discrimination based on nationality was prohibited when freedom of establishment was 
involved. That was the only EU law provision invoked by the Commission to monitor a reform of 
Spanish Port Law, which concluded in May 2017. No secondary EU regulations were enacted, yet, the 
reform led to the overruling of the staff recruitment system for cargo-handling services in Spanish docks. 
The new recruitment system was already designed by the Commission and transposed by an Act of the 
Spanish Parliament as if it was derived from a Directive. An infringement action and a ruling of the 
European Court of Justice were the formal mechanisms to make the design of the Commission 
enforceable. Notwithstanding the apparent simplicity of this reform, there were indirect normative and 
institutional mechanisms working through well-known dynamics of supranational integration. This 
paper presents an analysis of those mechanisms, paying particular attention to the role of direct effect in 
the ECJ infringement decision and to the use of soft law and institutional cooperation as covert 
integration strategies. 
Keywords 
Freedom of establishment; European Commission; European Court of Justice; Direct Effect; 
Infringement procedure; Covert integration. 
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1. Introduction: direct effect and covert integration in collusion* 
A year ago, the European Union succeeded in overruling the Spanish stevedores recruitment system as 
established by the Spanish Ports Act (2011). The national statute law had created a kind of especial 
corporations named SAGEP (Spanish acronym for Limited Company for Stevedore Management), 
empowering them with absolute control over labor conditions and staff selection for dock work. After a 
controversial infringement procedure, the Spanish Ports Act was amended and SAGEP were replaced 
by temporary employment companies, which meant a liberalization of this labor market. An analysis of 
the actions taken by the EU institutions to force such an amendment, pursuing the objectives of 
integration, reveals that the firm determination of the Commission towards the reform worked together 
with a series of concealed mechanisms. Among those mechanisms, two different courses of action were 
crucial to transform the objectives of the Commission in enforceable legal rules, overcoming difficulties 
linked to the action of Spanish trade unions, strike calls for cargo-handling port workers, delays in ECJ 
ruling implementation and a strong parliamentary opposition to the first Spanish Government measures.  
The first of those courses of action has a legal nature, which involved a very open or flexible 
understanding of direct effect of EU Treaty principles, rooted in the traditional hermeneutics of EU legal 
principles by the European Court of Justice. In our case of study, article 49 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union was the object of such hermeneutics, as invoked by the Commission 
against Spanish dock labor system. It was first mentioned in the reasoned opinion sent to the member 
state Government on September 27th 2012 and then, a second time, in the infringement demand1. As a 
consequence of the combined action of direct effect and primacy of EU Law in non-compliance 
judgements, if a state rule or practice is found to be an obstacle to EU economic freedoms such rule or 
practice should not be applied anymore. But, if necessary, it may also be modified or obliterated. In this 
case, the non-compliance declaration by the ECJ at the instance of the European “executive” gave birth 
to an amendment mandate as a normative result of direct effect interpretation2.  
The second course of action was clearly linked with the first, but it was focused on an institutional 
analysis. It involved the dynamics of implementation of EU scopes of competence by the supranational 
institutions out of Treaty formal provisions3. Sometimes informal instruments or objective-oriented uses 
                                                     
* This paper was written during my research period as Visiting Fellow at the Robert Schuman Center for European Studies 
of the European University Institute (Firenze) founded by the José Castillejo program of the Spanish Education and Culture 
Department (CAS170075), National Program for Talent Promotion, Mobility Subprogram, National Plan for Scientific and 
Technical Research and Innovation 2013-2016. It is also linked to the research project Challenges in the construction of a 
Space of Fundamental Rights in Europe (DER-2017-83779-P) founded by the Spanish Economy and Competition 
Department. I would like to thank all those who contributed to the final result with comments and suggestions.  
1 See the related documents in http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-12-1022_en.htm?locale=en (visited 22/02/2018) and 
in http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-559_EN.htm (visited 22/02/2018). See the European Court of Justice ruling 
of December 11th 2014 in case C-576/13, Commission vs. Spain (ECLI:EU:C:2014:2430), paragraph 1.  
2 It is detailed in first statement of the ECJ ruling C-576/13, cit. The designation of the European Commission as an executive 
is highlighted because, as it is known, it is not an exactly an executive in a state identification of the division of powers. 
3 Taking into account that, even though the different reforms of the Treaties that have led to the incorporation of new scopes 
of competence to the EU action, still there are dissimilarities between competences related to economic and market 
integration and other scopes, as the foreign and security police. It is also the case, although in a lower degree, with other 
fields of competences which have been incorporated to supranational dynamics, like some specificity in the scope of justice 
and home affairs. Genshel, P., Jachtenfusch and M., “Introduction: Beyond Market Regulation. Analyzing the European 
Integration of Core State Powers” in P. Genshel y M. Jachtenfusch, Beyond the Regulatory Polity?: The European 
Integration of Core State Powers, Oxford Scholarship On Line, 2014, pp. 1-23, p. 3 (www.oxfordscholarship.com). This 
fact can be verified, even after Lisbon, through corroborating the maintenance of especial requirements within decision 
making procedures, the different role of EU institutions or the creation of new and specific ones, like committees in charge 
of preparing decisions and recommendations. Genshel, P. and Jachtenfusch, M., “More integration, less federation: the 
European integration of core state powers”, EUI Working Papers, RSCAS 2015/33, 2015, p. 4, (http://cadmus.eui.eu/)  
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of legal procedures are the main mechanisms to develop specific EU actions. Some of those actions may 
be explained within the parameters of EU governance. Therefore, within the context of this dock work 
Spanish case, a second course of action was based on the concept and methods known as covert 
integration. Indeed, this is the case of a shift in the nexus of decision-making procedure, through which 
the Commission and the ECJ take the place of the EU legislative, Council and Parliament. The reform 
of the stevedore management system was fulfilled without an explicit legislative mandate and as an 
indirect solution to the blockage of the legislative procedure. In other words, as the proposals of the 
Commission to regulate cargo-handling in ports would not be approved, covert integration would make 
those proposals work through indirect mechanism of normative creation4.  
This paper aims to present a detailed review of how both courses of action worked in the Spanish 
cargo handling service reform. The singularities of this section of the labor market5 and the strong impact 
of maritime transport in economy, commerce and distribution justify the singular attention to the case. 
As an additional objective, this paper will confirm that market integration still functions with the same 
mechanisms of former periods of EU construction6, notwithstanding the financial crisis, and regardless 
of the changes included in the Lisbon Treaty for decision making procedures and institutional design.  
The paper will pay attention to the reasons of this concrete reform: why was the Commission 
determined to attain it? It will also focus on former failed attempts by the Commission to achieve the 
reform through ordinary procedures. The first section (2) of the study will start with the topic of EU 
action within the scope of maritime and fluvial transport and dock work. Then it will turn to a general 
analysis of the impact of the two courses of action, direct effect interpretation and covert integration 
mechanisms, on this field. A description of port labor work regulation by EU law will be presented, 
highlighting its relation to freedom of establishment. This preliminary approach will help us explain 
why the Commission decides to demand Spain before the ECJ and the terms of its complaint. The 
importance of a full understanding of those terms was deeply related to the former case law of the ECJ 
on the topic, which will be studied, in the second section (3), through two preliminary references. Both 
preliminary reference cases were referred to the recruitment system of stevedore workers in other 
member states. EU regulation and case law description will lead to a new focus on the dynamics of 
covert integration and on the legal hermeneutics of the Spanish case. In the third section, there will be a 
complete analysis of the infringement procedure against Spain (4). After that, and in the fourth section 
(5), the joint action of direct effect and covert integration will be presented as the engine of the reform 
of the Spanish dock labor system (5). Finally, some brief conclusions will be drafted (6).  
2. Dock work and free provision of services in European Union law  
2.1. The permanent exclusion of port cargo handling from secondary EU legislation  
The reform of dock work by the EU comes together with the principles of freedom of establishment and 
free provision of services as worded in article 49 TFEU. Indeed article 49 makes quite a general 
formulation of this freedom, so it is not so evident that a Member state should be obliged to restructure 
a concrete segment of labor market as it is port cargo handling. Nevertheless, the source of the mandate 
has already been anticipated and it is not related to detailed secondary EU regulation. On the one hand, 
                                                     
4 Héritier, A., “Covert integration of core state powers. Renegotiating incomplete contracts” in P. Bursens, C. De Landtsheer, 
L. Braeckmans y B. Seggaert, Complex Political Decision-Making, Routledge, London, 2017, pp. 15-30, p. 15. 
5 A complete study of the subject can be found in Rodríguez Ramos, P., La relación laboral especial de los estibadores 
portuarios, Trotta, Madrid, 1997. 
6 Indeed, and as an example, for the culmination of the objectives of the internal market between the last eighties and the 
nineties of the past century. See Snyder, F., “The effectiveness of European Community Law: institutions, processes, tools 
and techniques”, The Modern Law Review, n° 56-I, 1993, pp. 19-54, p. 27. 
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it is related to covert integration dynamics and on the other hand to an uncritical understanding of direct 
effect connected to economic freedoms.  
Obviously, neither covert integration strategies nor direct effect of article 49 TFEU would have been 
called into action if secondary legislation on dock work cargo handling services had been enacted. The 
TFEU, as well as the former ECT, confers competences to the EU to adopt measures in the scope of 
transports, including maritime transport. The competence is established in article 4.2.g) of the TFEU as 
a shared competence. Freedom of establishment in article 58.1 TFEU also refers to the “transports” 
section of the Treaty. Article 100.2 TFEU foresees that the Council and the Parliament, acting in 
accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, may lay down appropriate provisions for sea and air 
transport after consulting the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions7.  
As a result of the implementation of those competences the EU issued the Ports Regulation, approved 
on February 2017 by the Council and the Parliament8. This Regulation did not apply to the infringement 
procedure against Spain as it was issued well after the beginning of the conflict with the Commission. 
Its approval was almost co-terminus to the reform of the Spanish stevedore management system, as will 
be explained. Yet this Regulation was important for the current analysis as long as its provisions 
confirmed that cargo handling labor in ports was not specifically regulated in EU law. In the statement 
of reasons, prior to the Regulation articles, there was a general reference to the ECJ case law, which was 
a reminder that contracts in that field of activity would be subjected to the principles of transparency 
and non-discrimination. Then it was established that chapter II of the Regulation, related to port services, 
would not be applicable to cargo handling services –article 10 of the Regulation-, notwithstanding the 
possibility that those provisions could be enforceable in that field if member states so wish and so decide. 
Therefore, cargo handling in docks was an activity not regulated by EU secondary law, strictly meaning 
that the EU has not made use of its part of the shared competence. But, in a wider and not strict meaning, 
yes, the EU made use of its part of the competence. Article 1.2 of the Regulation included cargo handling 
among its defined scope of application. As a result, there was not an specific regulation, but it was 
included in the scope of application of EU law. Transport remains a shared competence. Member states 
can still rule within their part of it, not only because of the wording in article 2.2 of the TFEU, but 
especially because the Regulation confirmed that the states are free to apply it or not to that segment of 
activity. But the hermeneutics of the conferral system never were literal. On the contrary, the ECJ 
encouraged an understanding of the scopes of application of EU law that prioritizes the goals of 
integration9. The exemption was not such.  
The cargo handling exemption included in 2017 Regulation was not new to EU secondary law. 
Former EU regulations and directives linked to freedom to provide services and to staff recruitment had 
already made the same exemption. The Services Directive, dated 2006, excluded transport, making 
specific reference to port services10. To-date, there has not been a clear legislative agreement or 
consensus in the EU regarding dock labor, not even in the Ports Regulation11. The most evident proof 
                                                     
7 The ECT included the same competence and legal basis in the joint lecture of articles 50 and 80.2. The difference, and the 
innovation introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon, is that decisions regarding maritime transport should be adopted by the 
Council, exclusively, through qualified majority. Lisbon includes sea transport issues, among many others, in the field of 
action of the ordinary legislative procedure.  
8 Regulation (EU) 2017/352 of the European Parliament and the Council of February 15th 2017 on port services and financial 
transparency of ports (OJEU 3/03/2017). 
9 We speak about this teleology of integration, as defined by De Búrca, G., “The principle of subsidiarity and the Court of 
Justice as an Institutional Actor”, Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 36, 1998, pp. 217-235. See also the classic study 
by Weiler, J. H. H., “The transformation of Europe” Yale Law Journal, 1991, 100, 8, pp. 2403-2483. 
10 Article 2.2.d) of the Directive 2006/123/CE of the European Parliament and the Council, December 12th 2006, of services 
in the internal market (OJEU 27/12/2006).  
11 This is also evident in other exemptions included in EU secondary law. The Commission explains this and makes reference 
to former Directives of common provisions on concessions in the field of transport and other services. It is all explained in 
the Commission Communication on a European Ports Policy COM (2007) 616 final of 18/10/2007. The document refers 
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of this lack of consensus is the proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council 
on market access to port services, launched by the Commission in 2001. The proposal went through all 
the stages of the legislative procedure, including the conciliation committee, but was finally rejected by 
the European Parliament in Third Reading. The Commission withdrew the proposal in March 200512.  
The Commission proposal of 2001 made clear that free access to the European ports by service 
providers was a priority. A liberalization of cargo handling labor was one important objective of the 
proposal. Cargo handling companies should be free to work in any European port, with the only 
exemption of those ports with poor infrastructures or small size. Even in those cases, at least two 
different cargo handling companies should be authorized as a minimum. In this regard, cargo handling 
companies, as service providers, should be free to hire workers and staff at their convenience. This 
specific condition contradicted some of the stevedores’ recruitment national systems, working in several 
European ports. Among those ports were the Spanish ones, many of which had a very especial and 
strategic situation. One just has to think of Algeciras, Barcelona, Las Palmas in the Canary Islands, 
Bilbao or Valencia13.  
2.2. The actions of the Commission: dock work and soft law  
The EU law’s limited impact on dock work issues was counterbalanced by soft law. A significant 
amount of references to port cargo handling services can be found in several reports and 
Communications, introducing the topic of covert integration dynamics as will be described in a 
following section to this paper14. EU Commission Communications were the main soft law sources on 
port services until the enactment of the Ports Regulation in 2017. Consistently, the fundamental 
arguments of the Commission were those of the failed Directive of Port Services: freedom of 
establishment was a priority for dock work and cargo handling services.  
The first of these soft law documents was a Green Paper on Sea Ports and Maritime Infrastructure in 
199715. At the time, the Commission announced its intention to apply EC Treaty provisions to port 
services and in particular competition rules. Member states would be in charge of regulating and 
organizing such services at local, regional or national level, regarding subsidiarity. After a decade, the 
references to EC Treaty rules in soft law were shifted. Competition law was not referenced anymore and 
freedom of establishment emerged as the main Treaty principle governing port services objectives. The 
influence of the ECJ ruling in Becu was a clue to this shift, as will be explained in the following section. 
Indeed, more recent Commission Communications, of 2007 and 2013, already focused on freedom to 
provide cargo handling and other port services, a freedom based on two principles: one prohibiting 
nationality based discrimination; and, just in case of necessary restrictions to freedom of establishment, 
which could only be of an indirect kind, a proportionality principle.  
                                                     
to the exclusions made by the Directive 2004/17/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 
coordinating the procurement procedures of entities operating in the water, energy, transport and postal services sectors; 
and Directive 2004/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 on the coordination of 
procedures for the award of public works contracts, public supply contracts and public service contracts. The 
Communication is available in https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52007DC0616&from=EN (visited 15/05/2018). 
12 The European Parliament would have rejected the final proposal on support of sectoral trade unions. Molina Navarrete, C, 
“Competitividad, empresa flexible y estiba en los muelles: ¿Qué sí exige y qué no la Comisión por boca del TJUE?”, 
Revista de Trabajo y Seguridad Social, vol. 409, 2017, p. 5 (http://www.ceflegal.com/revista-trabajo-seguridad-
social.htm). COM (2001) 35 final — 2001/0047(COD). A report about the proposal and the legislative procedure stages it 
went through can be found in http://eur-lex.europa.eu/procedure/EN/2001_47 (visited 15/05/2018).  
13 COM (2001) 35 final — 2001/0047(COD), articles 7.2 y 6.5 of the proposal. 
14 Soft law is one of the mechanisms working in covert integration dynamics. See infra &. 5.2. 
15 COM (97) 678 final. 
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Economic freedoms would rule over cargo handling services, including staff recruitment systems. 
The model of staff recruitment effective in each member state, free or submitted to pools conditions, 
should be adapted to comply with non-discrimination rules. Wherever the recruitment system was 
conditioned by pools, mainly sorts of stevedores associations, Member states should remove obstacles 
to freedom to provide services. Any qualified provider, either a private or a company, should be free to 
offer cargo handling services in European ports. Wherever the hiring of particular dock workers or a 
determinate amount of them was established as an obligation for service providers, that would be 
considered an obstacle to economic freedoms16. Even if social dialogue and agreements on port labor 
conditions were obviously necessary, both, dialogue and agreements, would consider the objectives of 
liberalization17. These soft law recommendations and strategies would obviously have a greater impact 
on pools based recruitment systems, which was the case in Spanish ports. Dock workers associations 
usually held privileged positions in collective bargaining processes and were hard social activist. The 
Commission was aware that liberalization of cargo handling services would mean a loss of influence for 
those associations. That loss could be counterbalanced with those references to social dialogue, but a 
dialogue framed within the new criteria -freedom of establishment, non-discrimination and flexible 
recruitment conditions- would never be the same in some member states, Spain among others. 
However, soft law was not enough to achieve the desired reform of cargo handling services, 
especially in ports with strong pools and well rooted workers organizations. The decision to reform the 
sector was still up to the member states and, as obvious as it may seem, some member states would not 
be willing make changes that could lead to tensions, social protests and strikes. Maritime transport and 
goods distribution would be certainly affected and national markets damaged. Therefore, the 
Commission needed an enforceable rule beyond soft law and its legislative proposals on port services 
had not been successful. At that moment, covert integration dynamics shifted and soft law strategies led 
to enforcement of Treaty principles. The Commission activated an infringement procedure against 
Spain. The ECJ was the only EU institution that could create an enforceable rule from soft law and 
Treaty provisions, a rule compelling the Spanish authorities to reform port cargo handling staff 
recruitment system. The intervention of the ECJ would certainly be conditioned by previous case law 
on the topics: port services, cargo handling and stevedore recruitment systems. The Commission had to 
be sure that judicial precedents available were suitable for the case and sufficient to succeed in the cause 
against Spain.  
3. Ports and stevedores in the case law of the European Court of Justice  
An ECJ ruling of December 2014 declared that Spanish cargo handling staff recruitment system was 
contrary to freedom of establishment as provided in article 49 of the TFEU. The infringement was 
mainly related to the kind of especial companies, named SAGEP, which were empowered to 
intermediate in the stevedore labor market. These companies were entitled to settle the conditions for 
staff recruitment by cargo handling service providers and the service providers had to be members, as 
shareholders, of each port SAGEP as a condition for access. The ECJ judgement against Spain was 
delivered by a Chamber of three judges; it was a very concrete ruling and without an Advocate General’s 
previous conclusions. Notwithstanding the apparent simplicity of the ruling, up to 2014 there had never 
been either an infringement procedure on the topic or a case in which freedom of establishment was the 
key to decide about cargo handling issues. The Court of Justice had only delivered two sentences 
referred to port cargo handling services, both within the framework of preliminary reference procedures. 
Although the different characteristics of infringement and preliminary reference procedures imply 
                                                     
16 COM (2007) 616 final de 18/10/2007, cit., p. 13. 
17 See the EU Commission Communication in which it is confirmed that the future Ports Regulation will not apply directly 
to cargo handling issues: COM/2013/0295 final, p. 12, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52013DC0295&from=EN (visited 16/05/2018). 
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different approaches to a subject, the study of those precedents is helpful and necessary to understand 
the ruling of the ECJ against the Spanish SAGEP system. 
The first of those two preliminary references was raised by an Italian court: Merci Convenzionali 
Porto di Genova v Siderurgica Gabrielli, C-179/9018. The company Siderurgica Gabrielli had sued the 
company Merci Convencionali. This second one had obliged Siderurgica Gabrielli to hire workers for 
the download of German goods, although Siderurgica already had qualified staff for the task. Italian 
legislation conferred a monopoly for cargo handling in favor of some companies working in ports and 
established that workers should be members of those companies. Also only Italian nationals could join 
them.  
The demand of Siderurgica Gabrielli was received and admitted by the ECJ. The Italian judge asked 
if EC Treaty provisions related to free market competition, as well as those related to the prohibition of 
discrimination by reasons of nationality, applied to those privileged port companies. The answer of the 
ECJ was conclusive: Italian regulations were contrary to European law. The exclusive hiring of Italian 
workers for cargo handling services was contrary to freedom of movement and the privileged 
companies’ monopoly was contrary to the rules of competition. There was no way to justify the 
monopoly on a general interest of the Italian state. The ECJ explained that competition rules were 
entirely enforceable on those cargo handling companies. The legal monopoly allowed them to fix 
abusive salary prices and staff hiring conditions, sometimes beyond the reasonable demands of the 
service providers. As a result, extra charges and distortions of free competition were damaging internal 
market rules and objectives.  
The ruling in Merci Convenzionali contained some relevant issues for the ruling in Commission vs. 
Spain of 2014. The SAGEP system was somehow similar to the Italian staff recruitment model. The 
Spanish SAGEP were companies which monopolized the labor conditions and hiring procedures. Just 
like the Italian system, the Spanish one allowed the SAGEP to establish a minimum amounts of workers 
to be hired, even if the demanding companies would not need as many although there were also 
differences. Spanish SAGEP were not real companies like the Italian ones and no discriminatory 
conditions hindered any qualified EU national from being admitted in a SAGEP for recruitment. Both 
differences may explain why the Commission did not invoke free competition rules against Spain in the 
infringement procedure before the ECJ. The complaint only referred to freedom of establishment. 
Further reasons for this may be found in the analysis of a later case.  
The second preliminary reference was raised by a Belgian court at the end of the same decade. Case 
C-22/98, Becu19, was a consequence of criminal proceedings against Mr. Becu, the Smeg company and 
others. The defendants had hired stevedores for cargo handling labors who were not members of the 
Belgian pools. Belgian legislation provided that only certified workers could be hired for dock labors. 
Criminal punishments would apply on those who contravened such legal prohibitions. The Belgian 
judge decided to ask the ECJ whether those criminal law provisions were contrary to competition law.  
The Court of Justice answered in an evasive way. The judgment declared that Treaty provisions 
related to free competition would not apply to Becu facts. Firstly, even if Belgian dock workers were 
acting through pools, that kind of associations could not be treated as companies because they did not 
act as such. Treaty rules on free competition were meant for business companies and would not be 
enforceable against pools of workers. Nevertheless, and somehow off the record, the ECJ explained 
something more: Belgian regulations on cargo handling services could be contrary to freedom of 
establishment rules included in the ECT. Of course, there was not a problem of discrimination based on 
nationality as in the Italian precedent. The clue was how Belgian law obliged the demanding service 
                                                     
18 ECJ ruling of December 10th 1991, case C-179/90, Merci Convenzionali Porto di Genova v Siderurgica Gabrielli 
(ECLI:EU:C:1991:464). 
19 ECJ ruling of September 16th de 1999, case C-22/98, Criminal Proceedings against Jean Claude Becu, Annie Verweire, 
Smeg NV y Adia Interim NV (ECLI:EU:C:1999:419). 
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providers to hire only certified workers. The Court of Justice confirmed that this was a restrictive 
condition and, as such, it could mean an infringement of the freedom of establishment for EU companies 
wanting to provide services in Belgian ports. The argument was a repetition of a former ECJ doctrine, 
namely that even without a direct discrimination issue, obstacles to economic activities of other Member 
states nationals had to be removed20. As it was not the answer to the Belgian court’s question, the 
argument was not included as a part of the final conclusion.  
Importantly, the link between cargo handling staff monopolies and obstacles to freedom of 
establishment was understood and deployed by the Commission. As detailed in the former section to 
this paper, that was precisely the fundament of the Communications issued after the rejection of the 
proposal for a Directive of port services. The fundamental view of both institutions, the Commission 
and the ECJ, was that legal monopolies protecting dock labor staff recruitment might be in contradiction 
with freedom of establishment. Service providers not belonging to those privileged pools would find 
additional difficulties in the access to port labor. It was not a problem related to competition law, but to 
free movement. Here was also the reason for the Commission’s approach in the Spanish case, an 
approach based on the normative elements of freedom of establishment: a non-discrimination principle 
and the direct effect of the subsequent rules. The joint action of both elements should be enough to fight 
closed and exclusive cargo handling labor markets. The support of the ECJ, with an equivalent view of 
the matter, helped the dynamics of covert integration through the activation of an infringement 
procedure. 
4. The Spanish Stevedores and the European Union  
Well after the late nineties and in the context of the financial crisis, any obstacle to free trade and free 
movement within the internal market became more than a delicate issue. The Commission was 
responsible of rebalancing competitive disadvantages for service providers within the EU. A pool 
system for port cargo handling labor certainly caused competitive disadvantages, so the Commission 
had a strong economic argument to act against Spanish dock labor recruitment system. International 
downward price corrections was a real problem for European companies at Spanish ports, as cargo 
handling expenses were not subject to negotiations and that meant increases in transport cost. In 
addition, the Spanish stevedores recruitment system was not transparent enough. In a word: it was not 
efficient. Nothing was more evident that a company obliged to hire dock workers beyond its needs would 
suffer a decrease in labor productivity. In addition, the pool system legally empowered sectoral trade 
unions, an empowerment which created more difficulties to negotiate for more efficient cost structures21. 
As up to 2012 legislative EU proposals to regulate port services had all been unsuccessful, the 
Commission chose an alternative strategy, making use of its institutional position and of the enforcement 
procedures established in the Treaties.  
4.1. The action against Spanish state ports law 
The conflict arose with the coming into force of the Spanish Act for state ports in 2011. The Act gave 
legal support to the SAGEP system, through which dock workers should be certified, registered and 
hired. Cargo handling service providers should become SAGEP shareholders to have access to a 
particular port. Therefore, the Act confirmed a monopoly for the SAGEP scope of action, although those 
societies would not have commercial nature or business activity. SAGEP would be entitled to select and 
                                                     
20 Schmidt, S. K., “The shadow of case law. The Court of Justice of the European Union and the policy process” in J. 
Richardson y S. Mazey (ed.), European Union. Power and policy making, Routledge, New York, 2015, pp. 159-187, p. 
181. 
21 Molina Navarrete, C, “Competitividad, empresa flexible y…”, op. cit., p. 4.  
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offer cargo handling workers and would establish hiring and labor conditions regardless of the factual 
needs of the service providers.  
It was then when the Commission demanded the reform of the Spanish cargo handling recruitment 
system. The instruments in the hands of the Commission have already been enumerated: several soft 
law documents, unsuccessful legislative proposals, article 49 of the TFEU, two ECJ rulings and the 
infringement procedure. As in the Belgian Becu case, competition law would not apply to the SAGEP 
system. SAGEP were not companies, not for competition law. But, just the same as in Becu, the faculties 
of the SAGEP regarding staff recruitment and labor conditions could mean an obstacle to freedom of 
establishment. That was the infringement reason suggested by the ECJ. Article 49 TFEU was the only 
legal basis to proceed against this kind of monopolies. The Commission opened two procedures against 
Belgium and Spain.  
In the case of Belgium, the Commission sent a preliminary notice to the Member state government 
and it opened a series of negotiations. The situation was similar to the Spanish SAGEP controversy and 
the Commission was equally concerned with restrictions to freedom of establishment as a result of the 
cargo handling staff recruitment conditions. Then Belgian authorities agreed to a progressive reform of 
dock work conditions towards a more transparent and competitive model, having especial regard to port 
labor security and quality controls. The Commission could succeed without raising an infringement 
demand to the Court and the case was closed without sanctions in May 2017. It was possible that the 
increasing tension between the Commission and the Spanish authorities for the similar situation and the 
ruling of the ECJ in 2014 pushed Belgium to come to internal agreements and conclude negotiations22. 
Returning to the Spanish case, a preliminary notice and a reasoned opinion preceded the 
Commission’s infringement demand, following article 258 TFEU. In the reasoned opinion, the 
Commission repeated the guidelines of those former soft law documents, particularly the 
recommendations included in 2007 Communication. Freedom of establishment and restrictions caused 
by the SAGEP system were the main arguments against Spain, as well as the lack of proportionality of 
the measures preserving security and certifying quality. Even if the SAGEP were designed as a guarantee 
of technical qualification and security labor conditions for dock workers, the Commission understood 
that the very same guarantees could be attained with some other staff recruitment models. In addition, 
cargo handling service providers had to become SAGEP shareholders and recruit workers without 
bargaining, sometimes even beyond their needs, which meant alterations in cost structures and 
employment expenses. Alterations may have a shilling effect for those companies, maybe pushing them 
to keep away from Spanish ports23.  
The formal notice of the Commission was dated September 12th 2012. In subsequent stages of the 
proceedings the Commission just repeated those arguments. The Commission gave Spain two months 
to propose a reform of the SAGEP system. As Spain failed to present a plan for the reform, the 
Commission appealed to the Court of Justice in June 2013.  
The national government kept on defending the design of the Spanish ports Act. From the 
government point of view, the SAGEP intermediation system was an adequate mechanism to fulfill de 
obligations of Convention 137 of the International Labor Organization, which required guarantees for 
security in dock work and qualified staff registration. However, a Member state International obligation 
was not as a justification to avoid compliance with EU law. Moreover, the Court of Justice had already 
declared in Becu that article 49 TFEU was the clue to a conflict of this kind. That precedent and all the 
                                                     
22 See the references of the case: Infringement procedure number 20142088 (opened 28/03/2014). See the closing conclusions 
in the report of the Commission on Mai 2017 in http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-17-1280_EN.htm (visited 
26/02/2018).  
23 Infringement procedure number 20094052. For the preliminary notice arguments, see the press release published in 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-12-1022_EN.htm (visited 26/02/2018). 
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soft law documents produced by the Commission in the first decade of the century would work together 
and lead to the reform of the Spanish cargo handling recruitment system.  
4.2. The Court of Justice ruling: supporting the Commission’s claim 
A decision contrary to the Commissions claim was almost impossible. Although it was not unthinkable 
that the ECJ would reject an infringement demand of the Commission24, somehow this one was almost 
designed to succeed. Firstly, the Court had already drafted the main guidelines for a ruling of this kind 
in Becu: pools of workers could be an obstacle to freedom of establishment. Secondly, the Commission 
had understood perfectly and had produced a sufficient amount of soft law to support its position. The 
decision in case C-576/13, Commission v. Spain, must have seemed so evident that the Advocate General 
was not even asked for Conclusions and the Spanish government did not make efforts to deny obstacles 
to freedom of establishment25. The Spanish government defense was mainly based on practical reasons: 
the political difficulties of a reform, the economic and social cost of a change of system, as well as the 
referred contradictions with Convention 137 of the ILO. The dock work Convention established an 
obligation to register and certify the qualifications of port cargo handling workers and to have a priority 
for the recruitment of registered workers; not a single defense was admitted by the Court.  
The first of the ECJ assumptions was that SAGEP monopoly was an obstacle to freedom of 
establishment provided in article 49 TFEU. The Court would try to justify this assertion. Becu could be 
used as a precedent or, if not exactly, as a previous decision that would apply to the case26. In the Spanish 
situation, as in Becu, there were no discriminatory rules regarding the nationality of the workers. The 
European cargo handling service providers could all become SAGEP shareholders under the same 
conditions and with the same consideration as a Spanish company. But, using Becu’s doctrine, the Court 
found the evidence of a chilling effect for the freedom of establishment of European companies. When 
a service provider was obliged to become SAGEP shareholder, it was obliged to modify its cost 
structures. When a service provider was obliged to hire a particular number of workers, regardless of 
the factual needs of the business, it was obliged to assume inefficient expenses. The chilling effect 
especially affected European non Spanish companies which was the second assumption of the ECJ 
ruling27.  
Then the Court considered that such a kind of chilling effect, linked to the SAGEP staff recruitment 
system, was not directly but indirectly discriminatory. Direct discrimination measures were completely 
forbidden by EU law, but indirect ones could be admitted as long as they could be justified by a reason 
of general interest. The ECJ agreed that security in dock work and guarantees of continuity for cargo 
handling service were objectives of general interest. Stevedore activity was crucial for goods distribution 
and goods distribution was crucial for the internal market. The restriction to freedom of establishment 
could be thus justified, but an additional scrutiny was necessary: the proportionality of the restriction 
causing the chilling effect had to be tested.  
                                                     
24 Following the studies on infringement procedure practice, the Court of Justice almost always confirms the Commission 
demand. Infringement procedures are finally raised to the Court when all previous attempts to come to agreements between 
the Commission and the Member state have failed. See Falkner, G., Treib, O., Hartlapp, M. y Leiber, S., Complying with 
Europe: EU Harmonization and Soft Law in the Member States, pp. 207 y 208. 
25 Molina Navarrete, C, “Competitividad, empresa flexible y…”, op. cit., p. 9. 
26 Following the suggestions of Komárek, J. “Reasoning with Previous Decisions: Beyond the Doctrine of Precedent”, The 
American Journal of Comparative Law, Volume 61, Issue 1, 2013, pp. 149–172. See also Jacob, M. Precedents and Case-
Based Reasoning in the European Court of Justice, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2014. 
27 The requirements to become SAGEP shareholders were exactly the same for Spanish cargo handling service providers and 
for foreign companies. That was not under discussion. Belintxon Martin, U., “Derecho europeo, estiba y liberalización: 
algunas cuestiones clave sobre el conflicto de los estibadores”, Ars Iuris Salmanticensi, vol. 5, 2017, pp. 25-38, p. 34 
(http://revistas.usal.es). 
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This third issue about proportionality needed more than an assumption. As a part of the test, the ECJ 
checked the availability of any less damaging measure to achieve the same objective of general interest. 
The Commission had already proposed one: the use of temporary employment companies, instead of 
SAGEP, for the same purposes. Temporary employment companies could mediate in the cargo handling 
labor market, could help the regularity of the service and could control quality and security in dock 
work. Cargo handling service providers could be in charge of the management of those temporary 
employment companies, but they might also be managed by private and independent services.  
The Court agreed with the Commission. There were alternative measures to avoid the chilling effect 
on freedom of establishment. As a conclusion, yes, Spain legislation was contrary to article 49 of the 
TFEU. The direct effect of this Treaty provision, without secondary EU law enacted, was supposed to 
be enough to create the enforceable rule that was missing. But a declaration of infringement by the ECJ 
does not self-execute. The authorities of the Member states must intervene to execute an ECJ ruling. In 
this case, a reform of the Spanish states ports Act was required but the political situation of the country 
delayed this. That is the reason why in July 2016 a new stage of the infringement procedure was opened 
by the Commission.  
4.3. Enforcement and fines  
The Commission had the objective of a liberalization of the staff recruitment system for port cargo 
handling services. As negotiations with the Spanish authorities were unsuccessful, the infringement 
ruling of the ECJ meant an order of derogation and reform of the ports regulations, making it necessary 
to organize a new recruitment system. Obstacles to freedom of establishment should be overruled while 
security in dock work should be maintained with the high level of qualification of the stevedores as a 
requirement of the difficulties of the task. The Spanish government had to consider additional aspects, 
for instance the impact of the changes on the organization and financial structures of the national goods 
distribution system or the agreements needed with social actors and trade unions. In addition, the reform 
could not be enacted without parliamentary agreement, as the government of the Popular party had lost 
the absolute majority in 2015. There had to be a second general elections in 2016, as the 2015 result did 
not allow the forming a new government. The final reelection of President Rajoy was achieved without 
a firm majority. Any legislative proposal launched by the government needed parliamentary agreement, 
even if the measures came from an ECJ ruling in an infringement procedure.  
By July 2016, Spain had failed to make the necessary reforms in port cargo handling sector. The 
Commission appealed to the Court of Justice for enforcement measures invoking article 260 of the 
TFEU and asking the Court to order a coercive fine- case C-388/16, Commission v. Spain28. This 
subsequent procedure worked as a pressure tool, forcing the Spanish government to act. A first Act of 
amendment of state ports regulations was presented in February 2017, but the Spanish Low Chamber, 
the Congress of Deputies, rejected it29. After several strike announcements by the sectoral trade unions 
and some partial collapse of cargo handling services, the Decreto-ley 8/2017 was approved in May 2017, 
                                                     
28 Case C-388/16, Commission vs. Spain, ECJ Judgement of July 13th 2017, (ECLI:EU:C:2017:548). See the press release 
by the Commission in http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-1455_EN.htm (visited 26/02/2018). A recent academic 
commentary on the sentence, its precedents and the final result of all the process can be found in Menéndez de la Cruz, C., 
“La controvertida solución al modelo de la estiba y desestiba portuaria español. Comentarios a la Sentencia del Tribunal 
de Justicia de la Unión Europea de 13 de julio de 2017, relativa al procedimiento de condena al Reino de España”, Revista 
General de Derecho Administrativo, núm. 47, 2018, www.iustel.com . The article includes a critical view on the executive 
means and procedure used by the Spanish authorities for infringement rulings by the ECJ.  
29 Real Decreto-ley 4/2017 of February 24th for a reform of labor conditions and recruitment system for port cargo handling 
services as ordered in the ECJ Judgement of December 11th 2014 in case C-576/13 (infringement procedure 2009/4052), 
BOE 25/02/2017. 
Direct Effect and Covert Integration: A Critical Review 
European University Institute 11 
giving effect to the reform of the SAGEP system30. The enacted regulation gradually ended with SAGEP 
hegemonic position and privileges, as they were to be replaced by temporary employment companies. 
Cargo handling service providers would be free to hire workers. Following the ECJ ruling, the new 
regulation foresaw the creation of employment offices in state ports, to manage the free recruitment of 
dock workers. Those offices would act as temporary employment companies.  
The speedy coming into force of the reform, the day after its official publication, was not enough to 
discourage the Commission nor the Court of Justice from punishing the Spanish delay to fulfill the first 
ECJ judgment of 201431. Spain tried to justify the late execution of the ECJ ruling by appealing to 
internal issues: the national parliament had to be re-elected twice between 2014 and 2016 and the 
provisional government was not empowered to conclude agreements on the subject. However, the ECJ 
does not accept justifications based on internal proceedings to avoid EU law compliance as a 
fundamental economic freedom was at stake32. The fine would have a chilling effect, not only on the 
Spanish state regarding future delays in some other ECJ judgement implementation, but also on any 
other Member state that might have similar staff recruitment systems for stevedore labor. Indeed, as 
formerly explained, Belgium closed a negotiated reform of the national regulations on port cargo 
handling in the very same period33.  
5. The reform of cargo handling services in spain, BETWEEN DIRECT effect and 
covert integration  
After all of these stages, the port cargo handling system was ultimately reformed in Spain. The 
Commission was the main driver, but the reform was also a consequence of two joint courses of action: 
a normative creation process guided by the principle direct effect of EU law and a policy making strategy 
linked to EU governance mechanisms and covert integration. Both courses of action are frequent means 
for indirect harmonization of Member state regulations and they areaccepted with no further criticism. 
Both remain unquestioned even after the Lisbon reform, which confirmed the ordinary legislative 
procedure as the main and formal course of action for market regulation. Both seem to have been 
reinforced by the economic crisis period. On the one hand, political fragmentation in Member states has 
led to weaker national governments, weaker in their relation with the EU as well as in the internal and 
parliamentary perspective. On the other hand, financial and economic stability requirements are under 
the Commission and ECB control, making it more difficult for Member states to object to a 
Commission’s objective, which is clearly in the scope of market integration.  
5.1. The hermeneutics of direct effect in cases of non-compliance  
The first mechanism under scrutiny was direct effect of EU law. In particular, the analysis was focused 
on EU Treaty principles, as general mandates, and how a concrete and applicable rule is deduced from 
them through the action of direct effect.  
In the final stages of internal market construction, in the late nineties, direct effect of Treaty 
provisions was decisive to remove obstacles to economic freedoms even without legislative agreements 
                                                     
30 Real Decreto-ley 8/2017 of Mai 12th de mayo for a reform of labor conditions and recruitment system for port cargo 
handling services as ordered in the ECJ ruling of December 11th 2014 in case C-576/13 (infringement procedure 
2009/4052), BOE 13/05/2017. 
31 The Commission abandoned the claim related to a coercive fine and requested a lump-sum fine of 27 552 euros per day 
from the date of the first ruling until the coming into force of the Act of amendment, reforming the SAGEP system. The 
ECJ finally ordered a three million euros fine. 
32 Case C-388/16, cit., paragraphs 41 a 43. 
33 See note 22 supra &. 
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by the Council, the main legislator at the time34. Although such understanding of direct effect of general 
principles remains almost uncontested, a critical review of the Commission’s use of general principles 
to achieve specific objectives would introduce some aspects of legal interpretation that remain 
unexplained. Those aspects become especially relevant when addressing scope of competence where no 
secondary EU regulations directly apply. Legal interpretation in those cases was based on three 
assumptions: the first assumption was that a political decision, as formulated by the Commission, can 
be unconditionally projected onto unregulated scopes of a shared competence; the second assumption 
was that the political decision turns into a normative one when it was linked to a Treaty principle; the 
third assumption was that such transformation stems from direct effect or, at least, from that general 
principle of efficacy that Pescatore identified with the judicial hermeneutics of direct effect35.  
5.1.1. Mutations of direct effect rules  
It is the moment for a short reference to the legal nature of direct effect, first revisiting Van Gend ECJ 
ruling. In Van Gend the ECJ established that EC Treaty provisions could have direct effect, meaning 
that they could be invoked by individuals against a Member state action, practice of regulation. Direct 
effect is born within the scope of the preliminary reference procedure. In such a context, direct effect is 
deduced to support the cause of individuals when appealing to national courts by reasons of EU law and 
Treaty provisions. Direct effect’s original role was to contradict the assumption that EC Treaty rules 
were only a Member state issue36. Individuals could claim the effectivity of Treaty rules and secondary 
regulations. If a Member state, through law or practice, was impeding the efficacy of European law in 
detriment of the right or interest of an individual, a national court could decide about the enforceability 
of a Treaty provision37. Within that framework, individual claims would have especial consideration 
whenever they were in coincidence with the objectives of integration. Functionalism, as a feature of the 
ECJ legal interpretation, helped a federal vision of European law. The link between individual interests 
and the aims of integration was the first reason of direct effect, which was reinforced thanks to primacy, 
in Costa Enel, as a rule of preference for European law application.  
Based on such premises, the understanding of direct effect was progressively enhanced in the context 
of the preliminary reference procedure and related to individual claims38. Among some other 
developments39, the meanings of direct effect unfolded. As a result, direct effect is not actually reduced 
to protection of individuals’ interests and rights as invoked before national courts. It extended its scope 
of application to the general conformity of state law in contradiction with EU law40. Its efficacy in 
infringement declarations is somehow logical. When direct effect is admitted as a general principle, 
linked to the nature of European law system, when it goes beyond individuals claims and when it is used 
                                                     
34 Schmidt, S. K., “The shadow of…”, op. cit., p. 172. 
35 Pescatore, P., “The Doctrine of "Direct effect": an infant disease of Community Law”, European Law Review, 2015, pp. 
135-153. 
36 A former resolution considering that individuals are entitled to invoke provisions of an international Treaty is the famous 
Permanent Court of International Justice Opinion of March 3rd 1928 (B series, num. 15) on the jurisdiction of Dantzing 
courts.  
37 About the relationship between individuals claims and direct effect rules see and principles see Winter, J. A. “Direct 
applicability and Direct Effect. Two distinct and different concepts in Community Law”, Common Market Law Review, 
Vol.9-4, 1972, pp. 425–438, in particular p. 438. 
38 Craig, P. y de Búrca, G., EU Law, Text, Cases and Materials, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2015, pp. 186 to 188. 
39 The methodological requirements of this paper do not allow reviewing all those developments. For instance: how direct 
effect and primacy were initially linked and how they were differentiated through parallel doctrines like the effectiveness 
doctrine. See Dougan, M., “When worlds collide! Competing visions of the relationship between direct effect and 
supremacy", Common Market Law Review, vol. 44, 2007, pp. 931-963; y Claes, M., The National Courts´ mandate in the 
European Constitution, Hart Publishing, Oxford-Portland, Oregon, 2006, pp. 100 to 102. 
40 Prechal, S., “Does direct effect still matter?”, Common Market Law Review, Vol.37, 2000, pp. 1047-1069, p. 1050. 
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a tool to review state law conformity, it is somehow logical that it can also be invoked against a Member 
state rule or practice in the course of an infringement procedure. The Commission does not represent 
individuals, but the ECJ understands that individual interests, which may be protected by EU principles 
or rules, have to find a guarantee. For instance, in the case of Spanish stevedores, the Commission would 
be taking the defense of port cargo handling service providers wanting free access to Spanish ports41. 
Even so, an infringement procedure pretends to protect or achieve an objective of the integration 
program, quite a different thing than an individual or private interest.  
Therefore, the Commission takes advantage of what might be identified as a mutation of direct effect 
rules. This mutation allows invoking direct effect against state law or actions that may be contrary to 
the Treaty principle without an individual interest at stake. This first mutation goes together with an 
additional and earlier one: the assumption that general provisions of the Treaty, even principles, are 
directly applicable and produce enforceable rules in contradiction with state law or practice. If the 
original requirement of direct effect was the existence of a clear and unconditional directly enforceable 
rule, with no further development needed42, EU Treaty principles would have never been considered as 
directly effective without a mutation. The direct effect of a general rule or principle is conceived as 
direct applicability and it can be enforced either in preliminary reference or in infringement rulings43. 
There can be no other consequences: when the Commission invokes a general rule or principle of EU 
law, that rule or principle becomes enforceable against the Member state44.  
That is the way the Commission finds, and the ECJ produces, a federal coercion tool with a normative 
nature. Integration results can be achieved with no need of EU legislation, outside the formal legislative 
procedure. Direct effect is the instrument to produce that coercive tool. And once the ECJ confirms the 
rule, the rule is invincible. A third or subsequent mutation of direct effect rules is revealed when it 
becomes evident that it does not require an individual interest justification but just an institutional and 
political Commission proposal45.  
5.1.2. Complementary aspects 
The three mutations of direct effect rules are very relevant aspects of the ECJ interpretation of article 49 
TFEU in Commission vs. Spain, C-576/13. The ruling creates a directly effective rule from freedom of 
establishment principles. That rule is enforceable on the particular situation but on similar ones. It also 
goes beyond direct nationality based discrimination, which could be considered as the only clear and 
                                                     
41 And in fact the Commission also initiates infringement procedures as a consequence of individual claims. See 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/about-european-commission/contact/problems-and-complaints/how-make-complaint-eu-
level/submit-complaint_es (visited 06/03/2018).  
42 Hartley, T., The foundations of European Union Law, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010, p. 210. 
43 On the mixed comprehension of direct effect and direct applicability, see Winter, J. A., “Direct applicability and…, op. 
cit., p. 425. International law understands that both principles have a different function and legal nature: direct effect refers 
to the possibility of being invoked by individuals while direct applicability means an original integration in the Member 
state legal system. The ECJ does not make a distinction between both principles as the Court understands European law as 
the rule of law of a Community. Nevertheless, the ECJ sometimes has differentiated direct effect and direct applicability, 
explaining that a EU law provision can be invoked –direct effect- even if it is not directly applicable. Again, Winter, J. A., 
“Direct applicability and…”, op. cit., p. 437. Lenaerts explains that the ECJ makes use of the traditional International Law 
conception when International Treaties have to be applied within the scope of EU law. Lenaerts, K, “Direct applicability 
and direct effect of International law in the EU legal order” in I. Govaere, E. Lannon, P. van Elsuwege, S. Adamen, 
The European Union in the World. Essays in Honor of Marc Maresceau, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden, 2014, pp. 
45-64, in particular p. 64.  
44 Direct effect is reduced to a matter of enforceability, taking into account the characteristics of the situation and those of the 
discussed applicable norm. Pescatore, P., “The Doctrine of…”, op. cit., p. 153-154. 
45 Sobre el espíritu de los Tratados como pretexto, de nuevo Winter, J. A., “Direct applicability and…”, op. cit., p. 433. 
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unconditional prohibition in article 4946. This is an important aspect of this direct effect principle, as it 
ignores the clear and unconditional requirements of the original direct effect doctrine. Yet it does require 
additional measures, as the reform of a recruitment system cannot be done without. As long as a norm 
of principle, like article 49 TFEU, cannot reform a labor system, the normative acting principle seems 
to be closer to effectiveness than to strict direct effect. Still it produces an enforceable rule. How does 
it?  
The general Treaty provision is presented in its link, in the sense of material competence, to a 
particular EU policy and to a specific state regulation. The second one is the obstacle to the realization 
of the first. The connection between both is easy when a general rule or principle of EU law, like freedom 
of establishment, is decisive. Article 49 TFEU applies to cargo handling services. Those are market 
service and transport issues. It is more than justified. Then, in an infringement procedure, effectiveness 
works this way: the general rule or principle steaming from a Treaty provision precludes the state 
regulation or practice, which creates the conflicting obstacle to integration projects. To avoid a non-
compliance ruling, the defendant, the Member state, must prove that there is no such obstacle. If that is 
not the case, the Member state must justify the impeding measures either within a margin of appreciation 
or by an exception. Nevertheless, neither margins of appreciation nor exceptions are enough as non-
compliance justifications whenever a general rule or principle applies. The ECJ has repeatedly explained 
that margins of appreciation and exceptions must also comply with Treaty objectives. Even in those 
situations an infringement of EU law can be declared47.  
To sum up, a general rule or principle of EU law is always perfectible, especially when it defines 
objectives of integration. Obstacles to a general rule or principle would always be easy to be identified 
and difficult to be justified. In the end, justifications would be tested through a proportionality scrutiny. 
Proportionality would be measured but not from a state interest perspective. It would have to comply 
with an EU law perspective. Only if a state interest goes with EU law objectives, as announced in the 
general rule or principle, the Member state action would pass the proportionality test. But, even so, the 
plaintiff, usually the Commission, could claim that there are other mechanisms to achieve the same 
result and that those alternative measures are less damaging for the general rule or principle objectives. 
Then the state action would fail the proportionality test and an infringement would be declared.  
Those complementary aspects were all in the ECJ legal reasoning on the Spanish port cargo handling 
case. The main final argument of the ECJ, following the Commission’s Communications on ports 
services policies of 2007 and 2013, was that cargo handling services were within the scope of application 
of freedom of establishment, even if secondary EU law had failed to produce harmonization rules for 
the sector. The paradox is that regulatory exclusions and failed legislative proposals confirm the 
projection of economic freedoms on stevedores’ activities and give the Commission, with the help of 
soft law and the connivance of the ECJ, legitimation to fight Member states’ staff recruitment systems. 
Article 49 TFEU has direct effect, or effectiveness, and produces particular enforceable rules through 
the action of soft law, Commission proposals and ECJ rulings.  
5.2. Covert integration and institutional action  
This normative course of action, referred to direct effect, is linked to a chain of previous institutional 
and procedural actions. In this particular case, the Commission begins with legislative proposals, turns 
to soft law and then opens an infringement procedure. The ECJ final intervention produces the 
enforceable rule. The Commission and the Court are the institutional actors that, in absence of secondary 
EU law, achieve a regulatory result through a strategy frequently identified as a covert integration 
mechanism. Covert integration is framed within a conceptual analysis that points to different mechanism 
                                                     
46 Direct effect of this prohibition, nationality based discrimination, had already been declared by the ECJ, due to the 
unconditional nature of the rule. Pescatore, P., “The Doctrine of…”, op. cit., p. 140. 
47 Prechal, S., “Does direct effect…”, op. cit., p. 1063. 
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working in a sphere parallel to the formal design of the Treaties. As a result of such covert integration 
mechanisms, integration is enhanced through indirect ways. And these indirect ways frequently happen 
to be more effective that formal decision making procedures48. Spanish cargo handling reform shows at 
least two covert integration mechanisms: the first one refers to soft law as a primary source of 
enforceable rules; the second one refers to coordinated institutional action as a means to make 
incomplete regulations enforceable.  
5.2.1. Integration through soft law  
Soft law is the first of the strategies to produce coercive results whenever a legislative proposal of the 
Commission has failed to be enacted49. In particular, the cargo handling service case is framed within 
the Green Paper on Sea Ports and Maritime Infrastructure of 1997 and two port services Commission’s 
Communications, dated 2007 and 2013. These documents include guidelines and proposals for cargo 
handling services and staff recruitment methods. In doing so, they confirm that cargo handling services 
are within the scope of application of EU law. That is a traditional inclusive function conferred to soft 
law in academic analysis50.  
There is a clear link between the transport EU scope of competence and dock work, so soft law tools 
are not suspicious of being enacted ultra vires. On the contrary, Commission proposals have a 
promotional function. The Commission drafts and offers guidelines for future formal regulation of these 
services51. Finally, the promotional and the preparatory functions of soft law lead to a third one: to be a 
complement for hard law regulations wherever a leak could mean an obstacle to integration. Soft law 
would help to complement either Treaty provisions or secondary EU law. Even though soft law is not 
coercive, and not enforceable, its interpretative efficacy is not under discussion. Spanish cargo handling 
case is a good example. Soft law recommendations become enforceable when a general Treaty rule, 
freedom of establishment, is found to be directly effective and decisive to conclude an infringement 
procedure52.  
5.2.2. Institutional action: specifying incomplete contracts  
The second covert integration mechanism is related to the joint institutional action of the Commission 
and the ECJ. The model of joint action has already been described in academic works: although there is 
an incomplete regulation of a particular issue, the Commission acts to have it enforced. As a 
consequence, an at the Commission request, a Member state can agree to the demands of the EU and 
negotiate the ways to implement the requested measures. If the Member state does not cooperate, the 
Commission appeals to the ECJ through the infringement procedure. The ECJ frequently supports the 
Commission claim. By that means, an ECJ ruling creates a mandate from a non-enforceable 
recommendation. The incomplete regulation becomes complete. Specific rules then work in favor of 
integration objectives without the need of enacted EU legislation53. Indeed, this mechanism consists on 
simple judicial adjudication of objective based rules54.  
                                                     
48 Following Héritier, A. “Covert integration in the European Union” in J. Richardson y S. Mazey (ed.), European Union. 
Power and policy making, Routledge, New York, 2015, pp. 351-369, p. 352. 
49 Even though soft law is not always as effective when Member states fail to reach an agreement. Héritier, A. “Covert 
integration in…”, op. cit., p. 362. 
50 “Europeization” as a function: Peters, A. “Soft law as a new mode of governance” in U. Diedrichs, W. Reiners y W. 
Wessels, The Dynamics of Change in EU Governance, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 2011, pp. 21-, p. 34.  
51 Peters, A. “Soft law as…”, op. cit., p. 35.  
52 Peters, A. “Soft law as…”, op. cit., p. 36. 
53 Héritier, A. “Covert integration in…”, op. cit., p. 358. 
54 Héritier, A., “Covert integration of core…”, op. cit., p. 19. 
Miryam Rodríguez-Izquierdo Serrano 
16 Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies Working Papers 
As explained, the mechanism takes advantage of the infringement procedure established in the 
Treaty. The possibility of imposing coercive fines to non-compliant Member states, which is available 
since the Maastricht Treaty reform, has reinforced the virtues of this procedure, still dependent on state 
authorities’ actions to implement ECJ judgements. If the non-compliant Member state disregards the 
ECJ ruling, the amount of the fine increases. Therefore, individuals also have legitimacy to invoke an 
ECJ ruling of the kind if the Member state persistent infringement affects his rights or interests. In this 
case, EU cargo handling companies could have appealed to Spanish courts to make the ECJ ruling 
enforceable. Even if article 49 TFEU and Becu precedent would have been enough to open the 
discussion for a preliminary reference, the ECJ infringement ruling makes it unnecessary. The ECJ 
mandate was clear and unconditional and a cargo handling service provider could have confirmed his 
right of free access to Spanish ports, hiring dock workers at his convenience. One way or another, the 
Member state would be obliged to implement the ECJ ruling.  
In the Spanish cargo handling case, the collusion, Commission and ECJ working in the same 
direction, was guaranteed. The covert integration strategy is, somehow contradictory, transparent. In the 
first ruling against Spain, C-576/13 of 2014, the ECJ follows that hermeneutics of effectiveness, scope 
of application of EU law and proportionality explained in the previous subsection, all of it referred to 
freedom of establishment as a Treaty principle. Then, the ECJ offers a solution to the infringement 
situation, which has already been proposed by the Commission: temporary employment companies. 
Spanish reform of the state ports Act, through Decreto-ley 8/2017, makes an enforceable rule of the 
Commission’s proposal. Direct effect and covert integration work together to compel a Member state to 
harmonize its ports legislation without secondary EU law enacted.  
6. Conclusions  
The main conclusion of this paper was already announced in the introduction: cargo handling system 
reform in Spain became an issue of EU law and was enforced without specific EU formal regulation. It 
was not the first case of joint action of direct effect and covert integration mechanisms and it will not be 
the last. But there is more to say in relation to the reform. Even if the EU scope of action finished with 
the ECJ rulings, both the declaration of infringement and the establishment of coercive fines, Spanish 
authorities still had to find a way to implement the ECJ mandate. The reform took three years as a first 
attempt to approve the reform failed when the new staff recruitment measures were firmly rejected by 
the stevedores. Trade unions considered that the Spanish government was overlooking the position of 
Spanish collective bargaining labor system and their own role as negotiators. The opposition parties 
took advantage of the situation to punish the government in the Parliament. As a second conclusion, 
then, this case proves how EU normative and institutional action can extend its impact beyond 
integration objectives.  
In the one hand, this case shows how market integration dynamics keep on working with the same 
mechanisms as in the final eighties and nineties. Neither the institutional and procedural amendments 
of the Treaty of Lisbon -with a definite inclusion of the European Parliament as co-legislator or with a 
European Council preponderance to the detriment of the Commission-, nor the normative ones -with a 
more precise definition of the conferral competence system- seem to have altered such dynamics. 
Financial crisis has not modified the project for unification of market rules either. EU law economic 
freedoms still remove national obstacles to free trade and free competition. 
In the other hand, and nevertheless, social and political situation of Member states after the crisis 
show different reactions to coercive reforms like this, coming from EU action. Constitutional internal 
issues might have become more relevant, or more visible, when the time comes to implement EU 
obligations. It is precisely the example of collective bargaining constitutional position. The stevedores 
trade unions were unwilling to let the government act without their agreement and the opposition parties 
supported that protest in Parliament, regardless of the EU law infringement ruling. From the EU point 
of view, the joint action of direct effect and covert integration might be considered apolitical as tools for 
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integration; they are just a technical principle of EU law and a frequent mechanism of institutional 
cooperation. But from the Spanish state perspective, the political aspects of the conflict were crucial and 
unavoidable. It is the point where the shadow of the democratic deficit appears. Covert integration 
mechanisms keep working outside a strictly formal understanding of the legislative procedure and the 
competence system55. Direct effect is not an unambiguous rule. The teleology of integration had always 
moved in silent ways56, but in this case the social, political and media repercussions became evident for 
Spanish public opinion. It could have been a simple exception or it could mean the first of forthcoming 
objections to the requirements of EU integration objectives.  
 
Florence, May 2018. 
 
  
                                                     
55 De Bièvre, D., Bursens, P., “Patterns of covert integration in EU governance” in P. Bursens, C. De Landtsheer, L. 
Braeckmans y B. Seggaert, Complex Political Decision-Making, Routledge, London, 2017, pp. 31-39, p. 38. 
56 Weiler, J. H. H., “A Constitution for Europe? Some hard choices”, Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 40, 2002, pp. 
563-580, p. 572. 
Miryam Rodríguez-Izquierdo Serrano 
18 Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies Working Papers 
 
 
Authors’ contact details: 
 
Miryam Rodríguez-Izquierdo Serrano 
Constitutional Law Professor 
University of Seville 
Facultad de Derecho 
Calle Enramadilla 18-20 
41018 Sevilla 
SPAIN 
Email: Miryam.Rodriguez-Izquierdo@EUI.eu; miryamrizq@us.es; miryam@rodriguezizquierdo.com 
 
 
  
